Abstract: The 2016 peace accords between the Colombian state and the FARC created great expectations of peace across the region. However, four years later, Colombia is experiencing a growing wave of violence from numerous actors, including former FARC dissidents. What drove the emergence of splinter groups after the 2016 peace accords? This thesis argues that insurgents’ levels of cohesiveness and ideological commitment during negotiations significantly condition the long-term prospects for successful accord implementation. When insurgencies enter these processes with low levels of these two factors, peace accords tend to transform, rather than end, the conflict. The thesis examines this argument through an analysis of the FARC’s organizational and ideological properties throughout history and finds that while the FARC had traditionally been a cohesive organization, during the 2000s the COIN strategy and Plan Colombia weakened its organizational structure. Furthermore, its incorporation in the drug trade contributed to the dilution of its ideological commitment. When accords were signed, the FARC lacked the necessary levels of cohesiveness and commitment to implement and enforce the accords in their ranks, causing the emergence of splinter groups. This thesis recommends that in an eventual negotiation with insurgencies, governments must give careful consideration to both the organizational and ideological properties of such organizations to avoid splintering and recurrence of violence. ; http://archive.org/details/howhasthecolombi1094566733 ; Lieutenant Colonel, National Army of Colombia ; Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited
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