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Insurance law and incomplete contracts.

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  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
      INSURANCE law; CONTRACTS; MORAL hazard; BURDEN of proof; LEGAL judgments
    • Abstract:
      We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no‐audit case. We also highlight the conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the insured, provided that insurers are threatened with sanctions for bad faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
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