Persistence or Partisanship: Exploring the Relationship between Presidential Administrations and Criminal Enforcement by the US Environmental Protection Agency, 1983–2019.

Partisanship; Persistence (Economics); Presidential administrations; Criminal law; Law enforcement; United States. Environmental Protection Agency

Conventional analysis suggests that enforcement actions meted out by the US Environmental Protection Agency vary greatly across Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. Yet research fails to look beyond civil actions to explore how the agency engages in the criminal enforcement of environmental crimes over time or whether and how those outcomes change across partisan administrations. We explore these questions by using content analysis to build a comprehensive dataset of 2,588 criminal enforcement prosecutions, 1983–2019. The results do not suggest that outcomes under Democratic presidents are always substantially more punitive or under Republicans significantly reduced. Outcomes over time better reflect the growing sophistication and institutionalization of the enforcement process, declining budgetary realities, and the agency's organizational commitment to deter serious environmental crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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