کیفر در اندیشه ی هگل با تأکید بر ایده ی مسؤولیت جنایی شهروند منطقی.

Hegel's Theory of Punishment with an Emphasis on the Criminal Responsibility of the Rational Citizen.

Geist, as the central concept in Hegel's philosophy, embodies the unification of individuals' particular wills with the universal will. This unity is achieved through the dialectical progression of Geist, wherein individuals, as free subjects, recognize themselves within the universal will embodied in the state. The state, as the manifestation of the universal will, is essential for realizing the concept of citizenship. Without the acknowledgment and affirmation of the state, the notion of citizenship loses its meaning . Citizens, by virtue of their connection to the universal will, are committed to its imperatives. Punishment for wrongdoers is one such imperative, rooted in the necessity of preserving order and justice as prerequisites for the realization of freedom. A key insight derived from Hegel's writings is that the recognition of citizenship in relation to sovereignty inherently requires citizens' acceptance of responsibility. Individuals, as rational members of society, must be accountable for their actions . Likewise, the state is obligated to hold the offender accountable for their crime as an expression of respect for them as rational members. In this framework, punishment is viewed as the criminal's right-a right that consequentialist theories often reject. This explanation underscores the necessity of punishment independent of other considerations, such as deterrence through fear or unqualified rehabilitative measures .The increasing reliance on securityoriented or treatment-focused criminal policies in contemporary legal systems worldwide has fostered a sense of alienation between citizens and the justice system. Drawing on Hegel's philosophy, this article aims to propose a human-centered approach grounded in the intrinsic dignity of citizens, offering a fresh perspective in this domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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