Abstract: In this paper I reject Psillos' (2012) pleas against moderate nominalism (NM). NM is a brand of realism which proposes to restrict the rational belief to the purely nominalistic contents of scientific theories. Psillos disputes this pretension by arguing that Platonic contents play an indispensable role in explaining the success of science. In order to refute this stance, I do three things: I argue that scientific theories have purely nominalistic contents, defend the metascientific plausibility of the concept of nominalistic adequacy and rule out the existence of basic, physico-mathematical facts. ; En este trabajo rechazo los alegatos de Psillos (2012) contra el nominalismo moderado (NM). El NM es una variante del realismo que recomienda restringir la creencia racional a los contenidos puramente nominalistas de las teorías científicas. Psillos cuestiona esta pretensión, aduciendo que los contenidos platónicos desempeñan un papel insoslayable en la explicación del éxito de la ciencia. Para refutar esta postura, hago tres cosas: sostengo que las teorías científicas tienen contenidos puramente nominalistas, defiendo la plausibilidad metacientífica del concepto de adecuación nominalista y descarto la existencia de hechos físico-matemáticos básicos.
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